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One of the purposes behind the enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code was to place the law of commercial security into such a
form that the commercial lender could reach his business decisions on a
basis of his business judgment rather than on the inexorable dictates of
the law. In a way commercial leaders were in the same position as a busi-
ness man contemplating a proposed transaction and the Federal income tax;
in both cases, the tail wagged the dog; in one, it still does. One of the
results obtained from the enactment of Article 9 was that the barriers,
imposed mainly by the technicalities and queer twists of pre-Code law,
which held back many inexperienced lenders and their counsel from engag-
ing in inventory and accounts receivable financing, were removed. Inventory
and "proceeds" 1 financing in pre-Code days was a hard school, and its
practitioners acquired an experience which stood them in good stead and
which still has great carry-over value. One purpose of this article is to
provide a cautionary note to the general practitioner who is asked to give
an opinion on a plan of financing on the security of inventory. A slight
knowledge of the basic Article 9 concepts, as well as general knowledge of
the Bankruptcy Act, is presupposed.
*Attorney at Law; Member, Foster, Vogel & Stroh, St. Louis, Mo.
1. There are marked similarities between inventory and "proceeds" financing.
Both represent collateral in economic motion, and their use as collateral may sub-ject the lender to the same risks. Many lenders finance on both inventory and
proceeds collateral of the same borrower, since financing on the latter is a logical
extension of financing on inventory. On the whole, proceeds are probably more
desirable as collateral, whether they be receivables, chattel paper, or whatever.
Self-liquidating, they do not take on the label of distress merchandise with a
consequent fall in value if the lender is forced to look to the collateral for satis-
faction of the debt.
2. "It is . . . possible, however, that lenders-let us say 'country banks'--
who do not have the painfully acquired expertise of the specialists will be tempted
to take advantage of the Code's lowering of barriers." Gilmore, The Assignee of
Contract Rights and His Precarious Secuiity, 74 YALE L. J. 217, 219 (1964).
(209)
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Under pre-Code law, it was perfectly possible for a lender to finance
on the security of a borrower's inventory from raw material through work
in process and finished goods to the proceeds. It was, however, extremely
technical, somewhat expensive, required the use of several types of security
devices, and involved a good deal of paper shuffling, all merely to keep
the arrangement in the framework tolerated by the law. Article 9 changed
all of this.3 The diverse catalog of security interests-mortgages, field ware-
house receipts, trust receipts, factor's liens and so on, each with its own
formalities and inconsistencies-was eliminated, and in its place was sub-
stituted the single or unitary concept of a security interest.4 And the lender,
if he so chooses, may, once his security agreement is executed and his fi-
nancing statement filed, do no more, but sit back and reflect upon the
law which renders legally adequate that which would have been unviable
in Missouri prior to July 1, 1965.
Although the security interest may be conceptually unitary, practice,
as always, may make it something else. There is wide latitude for variation
of practice allowable under Article 9, and this variation may have a sub-
stantial effect on the rights and duties of lenders, borrowers and third
parties. Those reasons calling for a lender to use pre-Code practices re-
sembling those used in trust receipt financing in one situation, a field
warehouse operation in another, and factors lien financing in a third, can be
3. "The essential purpose of Article 9 was to bring to an end the long period
of fragmentation of personal property security law." Gilmore, supra note 2, at 227.
4. For example, something known as a "trust receipt" was upheld in Mis-
souri as a "bailment for sale," or consignment, typically a seller's title retention
device, which did not have to be recorded. In the situs of the origin of the trust
receipt, the Eastern seaboard, and under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA),
however, it was a third party lending device unavailable to a seller. See, Globe
Sec. Co. v. Gardner Motor Co., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S.W.2d 561 (1935), and Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Interstate Sec. Co., 197 S.W.2d 1000 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946).
Under the Code, if the parties "intend" a security transaction it falls under
Article 9 by virtue of § 400.9-102(3), RSMo 1963 Supp. even though it is, in
form, a "consignment." A true consignment may in any event be subject to
Article 9 filing rules if the consignor wants to hold off the consignee's creditors.
Caveat: "[T~he whole matter floats nebulously in that fog 'the intent of the
parties' out of which courts are so apt to evoke what they most want." L. Hand, J.,
I re German Publication Soc'y, 289 Fed. 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
Hereinafter, citations to the Uniform Commerical Code as enacted in Mis-
souri (ch. 400, RSMo 1963 Supp.) will be made without the reference to the
revised statutes, e.g. § 9-201. Citations to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962
Official Text with Comments, published by The American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will be made in
the following form: UCC § 9-201 (1962).
For general reference to pre-Code security law, see, Dusenberg, Financing In-
ventory Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Resumg for Missouri Lawyers,
29 Mo. L. REv. 462 (1964).
[Vol. 31
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best expressed by the phrase "reduction of lending risks." Less cryptically
stated, there is a world of difference between the minimum of care allow-
able under the Code and that which the prudent lender may feel called
upon to do in a given situation.
II. Basics
A security interest is nothing but an interest in someone else's prop-
erty to secure performance of an obligation. 5 It matters not how it was
created, by a written security agreement transferring some intangible rights,
or by an oral security agreement evidenced by a transfer of possession;
the rights and duties of the lender and borrower to each other and the
collateral are much the same. 6 The key for solution of the problems raised
by the risks of lending, which in the main are third party problems, lies
not in the means of creation of the security interest, but, primarily, in
the means by which the security interest is perfected.
"Attachment"7 initiates the relationship of the lender and borrower
to the specific item of property serving as collateral. This article will de-
fine "perfection" as the status of the property with regard to certain third
persons who seek to assert claims to it, and will define "priority" as the
relationship to the property and to each other of secured lenders, other
creditors, and purchasers claiming an interest in it. It is essential that
counsel distinguish between the concepts of perfection and priority in order
to gain any perspective of Article 9 other than that of a hodge-podge of
rules to be learned by rote.
"Perfection" means immunization of the security interest from attacks
made by persons having no previous contractual or property rights in the
collateral: primarily, lien creditors. No security interest can be perfected
until it has attached and the lender has either taken possession of the col-
lateral or filed a financing statement. Once the three-step attachment
process plus the additional step of possession or filing has been made, no
matter what their order, the security interest is perfected. s Perfection is
selective; a perfected security interest may be protection against the attack
5. § 1-201(37).
6. See generally Article 9, parts 2 and 5.
7. § 9-204(1). A security interest may not attach until there is an "agree-
ment" that it attach (not necessarily a "contract"), the lender has given "value,"
and the borrower has "rights" in the collateral. The reader is constantly ad-
monished to refer to § 1-201 for definitions.
8. § 9-303 (1).
19661
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of lien creditors,9 yet at the same time may be no protection against other
persons attempting to reach the collateral, such as a buyer.10
III. NOTICE As PERFECTION
Perfection, under prior law, was attained by foreclosing two avenues
of lienor attack against the collateral. If the collateral were inventory,
a lien creditor seeking to reach it could assert that it was "fraudulent"
on the basis of (a) the ostensible ownership of the mortgagor, if the mort-
gage or other security device were unrecorded, or (b) the lack of the
mortgagee's dominion, if the mortgagor had the power to deal freely
with the collateral and its proceeds.
By its very nature, perfection through recording insured that a mort-
gage would be perfected against the attacks of creditors only some time
after it was executed. Since the document itself was recorded or filed, there
was always a lapse of time between execution and recording, a gap in
which trouble could occur. Missouri law provided that if the mortgage
were recorded within a reasonable time after its execution, the time of
recording related back to the time of execution." If recording was not done
in a reasonable time, this benefit did not obtain; there was a "fraud"
committed against anyone who became a creditor in the gap because he
had been misled by the apparent affluence of the mortgagor. Perfection
dated only from the time of recording.' 2 If there were no time gaps,
the lien creditor could not prevail,' 3 so it was easy to see that the lien
creditor's assault would be made upon the "reasonableness" of the time
in which the mortgage was recorded. Under state law, this was not neces-
sarily dangerous. The "gap creditor," for example, the stationer who de-
livered five dollars' worth of rubber bands and paper clips while the
mortgage was unrecorded, could sue to judgment and levy on the collateral
after recording. But the mortgagee himself, if he had to, could satisfy
the lienor's claim and save his mortgage, and even if he did not, the
judgment creditor could levy on only enough of the collateral to satisfy
the debt. In bankruptcy, however, the result was more dangerous. The
trustee acquires, under section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, the rights
9. § 9-301()(b).
10. §§ 9-307(1), 9-301(1)(c).
11. Barton v. Sitlington, 128 Mo. 164, 30 S.W. 514 (1895); United States
Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Lauchli, 150 Fed.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1945), and cases cited
therein.
12. In the Matter of Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959) (withhold-
ing mortgage from record does not invalidate it).
13. See, Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953).
(Vol. 31
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of any existing creditor,' 4 and under bankruptcy doctrine the trustee ex-
pands the "gap creditor's" claim for five dollars to take up the entire value
of the mortgaged collateral. 15 Astonishingly, under state law if the mort-
gagee took possession under a late recorded mortgage before the "gap
creditor's" levy, he would win; 16 needless to say, this did not work out the
same way in bankruptcy.' 7
Under the Code, recording is eliminated, and notice filing, a concept
borrowed from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,'8 substituted. Instead of
filing or recording the mortgage itself, a simple notice, signed by both the
borrower and lender, is filed. This 'gives public notice that the latter is
financing the borrower on the security of certain collateral described in
either specific or general terms' 9 in the notice or "financing statement.)'
It may include more than one type of collateral, such as inventory, pro-
ceeds and equipment, and may cover after-acquired property; it also
serves to perfect any security interest arising to secure advances made
in the future. The third party examining the records is put on notice that
some of the borrower's property may not be free from encumbrance. If
he has a legitimate interest, it is up to him to inquire of the borrower or
the lender to ascertain the details, although a financing statement covering,
for example,
all inventory of sugar, including raw sugar, sugar in refining process,
and finished or refined sugar, whenever acquired, all proceeds of
the sales of sugar, and sugar refining equipment
could hardly be any clearer and could hardly tie up the borrower's chattel
property more effectively under the priority rules.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1) (1958); by virtue of § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1958), the trustee acquires the rights of a hypothetical creditor who, under state
law, makes a general levy on the bankrupt's property on the date of bankruptcy;
and through § 67(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1958), the trustee takes over lien
rights of certain creditors who have made their levies within four months.
15. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). For an unusual case see Exchange
Bank v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1955).
16. Jim Keehn Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 364 S.W.2d 629 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
17. The trustee, even if he had no -chance to reach the collateral under
§§ 70(c) or (e), could possibly reach it as the subject of a preferential transfer
under § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958). If the mortgagee recorded at any time
before a levy made by one who was a creditor prior to the mortgage, the mortgage
was valid against the levy. Rock Island Nat'l Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432, 34
S.W. 869 (1896).
18. This was never enacted in Missouri, although -the Factors Lien Act
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The requirements set out in the Code for execution of an effective
financing statement are both simple and explicit. They are the subject of
much literature,2 0 and nothing need be added here except the admonition
that the prudent lender should hew close to the line; there have been
some rather harsh and mechanistic opinions regarding failure to comply
with the rules,21 and bona fide efforts to comply have not been good
enough.22 The end result is substantially the same as under pre-Code
law, except that the result is reached by dealing with the matter as a
question of priority of claims rather than of fraud. There is no perfection
and the security is vulnerable to any lien creditor without knowledge of
the security interest.23 Lender's counsel should be extremely careful not to
allow himself to me jollied or browbeaten by lender's salesmanager or loan
manager into allowing field men to cut corners so as not to clog or delay
sales or making loans. It is generally not the manager who has to explain
what happened when a security interest goes sour.24
Because the financing statement is separate from the security agree-
20. The required contents of financing statements are set out at § 9-402.
The Missouri Secretary of State's Office has prepared a pamphlet in which ap-
proved forms are set out and filing instructions given. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE MANUAL (1965).
21. In re Kane, 55 Berks County L.J. 1, 7, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1962), held a
photographic copy of a properly signed financing statement was not a signed
financing statement. The 1965 Missouri legislature remedied this by amending
§ 9-402. S.B. No. 241, § 1, Laws 1965. In the Matter of Leiby, 58 Lanc. L.R. 39
(E.D.Pa. 1962), held that the nature of the collateral controls the place of filing.
In Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964), a
conditional seller and buyer in their contract provided that what would otherwise
have been a fixture was to remain personal property. The seller filed a financing
statement locally, the proper place for fixtures, but not centrally. Filing did not
perfect. The seller should have filed as though the security interest was in personal
property. (Where would a creditor have looked to check liens on the borrower's
equipment?) In the Matter of Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962), "substantial
compliance" was not found where borrower's address was omitted from financing
statement.
22. See § 9-401(2).
23. § 9-301(1) (b). Under prior law, the levying creditor's knowledge of the
security interest was irrelevant. See § 443.460, RSMo 1959 (repealed); Bevans v.
Bolton, 31 Mo. 437 (1862). Failure to record was a "fraud in law." The Code
has not repealed the Missouri statutes relating to fraudulent conveyances, §§ 428.010-
.110, RSMo 1959, but as a statute enacted later in time, the Code should control
in case of conflict.
24. The views of a financing seller toward his credit transactions may vary
widely from those of a third party lender. Although he may derive some revenue
from financing charges (we are not speaking of consumer financing), the seller's
prime source of revenue is the sale, or the manufacture and sale, of his goods.
Accordingly, he is sales oriented and does not think himself a lender as such,
and he may legitimately determine that his best interests lie in keeping open
the greatest number of outlets through which his goods pass to the buying public.
6
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ment, it can be filed before execution of the agreement, 25 insuring that the
security interest is perfected when it is created. It was the intent of the
drafters that the notice would warn off other lenders, allowing the borrower
and the lender to complete their arrangements in peace. But, if the financing
statement is filed after creation of the security interest, there is no relation-
back to give protection from the lien of any creditor without knowledge
which reaches the collateral before filing: 26 his claim is prior to that of the
lender. Only in the special case of purchase money financing is there any
ielation-back, or rather escalation of priority, to cut off the intervening
lien creditor.27 The rule is simple: except in the special case of the pur-
chase money lender who must perfect by filing within ten days to gain a
priority over intervening lienors, perfection of the inventory security in-
terest, or invulnerability to liens, dates from and after the date of filing.
The former exception made for the "gap creditor" is eliminated; if he
levies with knowledge of the security interest or after the financing state-
ment is filed, his lien is subordinated to the security interest.28 The "gap
lienor" is substituted. The question of fraud is eliminated as well. In bank-
ruptcy, the Code lender is given twenty-one days to file before the trustee
may attack the security interest under section 60 as a preference. 29 If
To do this, he may sell, for credit, to dubious risks or eliminate the use of risk
foreclosure procedures available to him, even though it means that he will be
faced with credit losses that he could otherwise have avoided. On the other hand
the third party lender generates his revenue on loan interest and other charges.
Although he must maintain a volume of loans to operate at a profit, he may be
far more concerned with reduction of risks and the safety of his loan, even
though, by his insistance on the adoption of risk reduction procedures, he may
not make as many loans as he might otherwise do. The money which he loans
is money which he, himself, has borrowed or has received from depositors, and he
must eventually repay it.
25. § 9-402(1). Industrial Packing Prod. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
26. § 9301(1)(b).
27. § 9-301(2).
28. The drafters of Article 9 have removed the label of "fraud" from failure
to file by providing that unperfected security interests are "subordinate" (not
void or voidable) to the rights of the lien creditor without knowledge who levies
before the security interest is perfected. No provision is made for the "misled"
gap creditor; he must levy before perfection of the security interest or his lien is
subordinate to the security interest.
29. Under § 60(a)(7)(I), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (a)(7)(I)(1958), if state law
provides that a lender must file (or record) within a certain time limit, up to a
twenty-one day maximum, to perfect, and the lender does so, the transfer is
deemed to have been made at the time of the actual transfer; if no time limit is
specified, the lender is given twenty-one days to perfect. If he perfects after the
twenty-one day period, the transfer is deemed to have taken place at the time
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filing is made during that period, the trustee cannot view the transaction
as a preferential transfer made within four months of bankruptcy, so
there is a "relation-back" of perfection in bankruptcy. Under sections
70(c) and 70(e),80 the trustee can reach the collateral only if the security
interest is unperfected on the day of bankruptcy or if there was some
actual creditor who could have reached it. With the elimination of the
"gap creditor" by the Code, much of the sting was taken out of section
70(e).
Inasmuch as the object of carrying an inventory is to ultimately sell
it, a buyer in the ordinary course of business8 1 takes his purchase from
the borrower free and clear of the lender's security interest. He, in effect,
has priority over the lender, who cannot perfect a security interest in
inventoy against such a buyer, even though the latter has actual knowledge
of the security.32 This is merely a continuation of the doctrine running
through the Code rendering sales by a merchant in the ordinary course
of his trade virtually unassailable. In other words, the law merchant
doctrine of inviolability of sale is favored over the common law doctrine
The twenty-one day time limit is not the time in which a lender must perfect
to receive the benefits of relation-back under state law; it is the time in which
a lender must perfect to avoid the effect of a subsequent levy. There are no "gap"
creditors under the Code. Every Code lender is subject to, and protected by, this
twenty-one day limit, even the purchase money lender who is given a special ten
day grace period for filing. The ten day limit does not impose any penalty on the
purchase money lender; he stil has twenty-one days in which to file before he en-
counters preference problems. When any Code lender perfects his security in-
terest, he is safe from subsequent levy. If he happens to occupy the special status
of a purchase money lender, and if he perfects by filing within ten days after his
borrower takes possession, he receives priority over the claim of an intervening
lienor. If he perfects after ten days, he loses his chance for priority status against
intervening lienors, but his perfection is still good against any subsequent lienors.
This is really, then, a situation of filing to achieve perfection, but doing something
else, in addition, to achieve a special priority status. And under § 60, perfection,
not priority, controls. See, the statement of Peter Coogan, Symposium-A Practical
Approack to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus.
LAW. 5, 29-30 (1963).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c), (e) (1958).
31. § 9-307(1). The "buyer in the ordinary course of business," although
nothing but a special case of common law tort-feasor, is given preferred treatment
throughout the Code. See § 1-201(9).
32. If, however, the buyer knows that a sale to him by a borrower is a viola-
tion of the security agreement, he no longer occupies his special priority status as
a buyer in the ordinary course of business, § 1-201(9), and he can no longer cut
off the lender's rights. Regardless of any prohibition against it in the security
agreement, the borrower may always transfer his "equity" in the collateral, § 9-311,
but, in turn, the lender may provide in the agreement that such a transfer will
constitute a default. Prohibitions against transfer-at least absolute prohibitions
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of inviolability of- title, thus completing the trend fostered by the growth
of commerce through the centuries. Even so, the lender, however, receives
more than he did prior to passage of the Code.83 If the security agreement
covers "proceedS,"3 4 they are automatically transferred to him as security,
without separate assignments, and the same financing statement that
perfected his security interest in the inventory can perfect his interest in
the proceeds.3 5
IV. POSSESSION As PROTECTION
As under pre-Code law, perfection of a security interest may also be
obtained by taking possession of the collateral,3 6 or more properly, by
denying possession of the collateral to the borrower.37 Denial of possession
to the borrower served two purposes in the eyes of the pre-Code law: (1)
he was deprived of the apparent affluence to deceive general creditors who
might advance funds on the strength of his inventory and then, on levy,
be unable to reach it because title was outstanding in another, and (2)
he was deprived of the power to deal with the property as though it were
his own, which power was, according to the courts, inconsistent with the
existence of a security interest and vitiated the mortgage on the grounds
of fraud. A lien creditor could levy on the inventory successfully even
though the chattel mortgagee had recorded, if the mortgagor had power
to deal with the goods. 38 If the lender or someone else for him had possession
33. By consenting to the sale of the collateral and the collection of the pro-
ceeds by the mortgagor, the mortgagee was held to look personally to the
mortgagor for the payment of the debt and to surrender the lien. Morris Plan
Co. v. Universal Credit Corp., 237 Mo. App. 365, 168 S.W.2d 136 (K.C. Ct. App.
1943). Usually, in the situations in which the question arose, the mortgagor
was insolvent in both the equity and the bankruptcy meaning of the word.
34. "Proceeds" may include both "cash" and "non-cash" proceeds. § 9-306(1)
and (2).
35. Filing alone may not protect the lender on chattel paper. He may either
have to take possession, or at least make his interest known by marking the
actual instrument itself, often with a rubber stamp. This itself may be inade-
quate if the proceeds are claimed under § 9-306(3) as proceeds of the sale of
collateral subject to a perfected security interest. § 9-308.
36. §§ 9-302(1) (a), 9-305.
37. Donald v. Suckling, L.R. 1 Q.B. 585 (1866); Proctor v. Shotwell, 105
Mo. App. 177, 79 S.W. 728 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904); Grand Ave. Bank v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 135 Mo. App. 366, 115 S.W. 1071 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
§ 9-205.
38. In Missouri, as opposed to, say, New York, the rule was much less rigor-
ously applied; the lender must have consciously allowed the borrower to sell the
collateral and dispose of the proceeds. Compare Brooks v. Wimer, 20 Mo. 503(1855), wit/k Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931).
19661
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though, that was another story. And under the Code, the lender who
perfects by possession still foils the lien creditor.
The oldest security interest known is possessory (probably the pledge
or pawn or something very similar), and in the days prior to the Code
the pledge was the safest security interest a lender could use. Although
by no means invulnerable to attack, so long as the lender held his posses-
sion, he had only to fear three things: defects in the underlying obligation,
such as a usurious note39 or lack of proper execution of the agreement; 40
defects in the collateral, that is, "quasi-contraband" collateral 41 or loss
of value in a declining market; and defects in the pledgor's ownership,
usually some pre-existing claim of a third party which cannot be cut off
by the pledge. These, however, were and are the ills to which all security
interests are subject. There was one joker in the deck: the pledgor could
not have possession if there was to be a pledge. And if he did not have
possession, how could he sell? Possession, when held by the lender, could
be an onerous burden for him, too.
Because of the physical limitations of bank vaults, which are fine
for holding jewelry, watch movements and securities, lenders turned to
commercial warehouses to hold possession of boat loads of raw sugar, car
loads of air conditioners and bags of cement.42 Commercial warehouse
space is costly, however, and many borrowers objected to meeting this
cost when they, themselves, had available storage space on their own
premises. To meet this demand, the commercial warehousemen established
warehouses away from their regular premises in the "field," and field
warehousing was begun. The field warehouseman simply establishes a
regular warehouse on the borrower's premises. He is a licensed public ware-
houseman,43 and he leases warehouse space from the borrower, receives
goods for storage and issues warehouse receipts.
39. Usury, small loan legislation, and retail installment sales acts are not
repealed by the Code. § 9-201.
40. Unfortunately for the unwary, the Code does not eliminate all of the
traps of the common law. Delivery of a writing may be conditional; if a condi-
tion precedent to the formation of a contract is unfulfilled, there is no contract.
See Kelley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 352 Mo. 301, 177 S.W.2d 435 (1943).
41. The prime example of "quasi-contraband" is liquor. Many states stren-
uously regulate the amount and duration of loans between liquor "manufacturers,"
wholesalers and retailers.
42. Generally, reference is made to Article 7, §§ 7-101-603 for the ground
rules for documents of title. See Stroh, Documents of Title, 30 Mo. L. REv. 300
(1965).
43. Formerly, it was important that warehouse receipts be issued by "ware-
housemen." See National Bank of Commerce v. Flanagan Mills & Elevator Co.,
(Vol. 31
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Both commercial and field warehousemen are subject to Article 7
of the Code, and their receipts have the status of documents of title: they
are commercially valuable, and the holder of a warehouse receipt has, gen-
erally, good collateral for a loan.4 4 Practice generally varies between the
commercial warehouseman and the field warehouseman. The borrower,
if he uses commercial warehouse facilities, makes the bailment himself,
takes the receipt, and pledges it to the lender. The lender then makes his
loan on the collateral of the receipt itself. On the other hand, the field
warehouseman,45 by prearrangement, receives the goods from the borrower
and issues non-negotiable receipts directly to the lender. Because of the
characteristics of non-negotiable warehouse receipts and the pre-arrange-
ment, the field warehouseman is less an independent bailee, and more an
agent who holds possession for the lender.46 But he cannot escape his obliga-
tions on the warehouse receipts. 47
If a warehouseman does not deliver the warehoused goods to the
receipt holder, if he cannot deliver because the goods are missing, or if
he cannot deliver the goods described in the receipt, he is subject to suit.
Since he is normally both solvent and bonded, he may be in the eyes of
the lender-receipt holder a far more satisfactory person to sue than the
insolvent borrower who actually caused the trouble by misdescribing the
goods to the warehouseman. In addition, the warehouseman's possession
is akin to a pledgee's for audit purposes. Each receipt must state the quan-
tity of goods stored under it. The lender can make a "paper audit" of his
collateral without sending one of his field men to the borrower's premises
to make a full physical inventory every month, by using this information,
268 Mo. 547, 188 S.W. 117 (En Banc 1916). Otherwise the receipts may not be
"warehouse receipts." Compare §§ 406.010(13), 405.020, 406.200, RSMo 1959 (re-
pealed), with §§ 7-102(1)(h), 7-201, 7-401(d).
44. See Braucher, Documents of Title, UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE HAM-
BOOK, No. 4 (1958).
45. There is very little literature on field warehousing in the journals. See
Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 991 (1942). Practice has
changed. See also, Funk, Secured Borrowing by Small Business, 13 Bus. LAw.
335 (1958).
46. Under the Warehouse Receipts Act, ch. 406, RSMo 1959 (repealed) and
under Article 7 of the Code, the -person who deals with negotiable receipts deals
with the documents themselves as things of value, for they stand in place of the
goods. To a much less degree is this true of non-negotiable warehouse receipts;
for example, to effect a complete transfer of the goods, the bailee who has is-
sued a non-negotiable warehouse receipt must be notified of the transfer, and to
procure delivery of the goods from the bailee the receipt need not be surrendered.
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and deducting authorized withdrawals. Common prudence would dictate,
however, that the contents of containers, whether they be oil tanks or
cartons of canned goods, be spot-checked on occasion. Finally, a warehouse-
man is bound to hold the goods until the warehouse receipts, if they are
negotiable, are surrendered to him, or until he receives written instructions
to deliver, if they are non-negotiable. If the warehouseman is competent,
the borrower cannot liquidate his inventory without the lender's knowledge.48
One of the often repeated dicta in the field warehousing business is
that the warehouseman must maintain open, notorious, and continual
possession of the collateral. 49 The presence of the warehouseman on the
borrower's premises must be open and notorious, but it was never quite
true that the warehouseman had to hold continual possession in the sense
that it had to be tightly held with both hands.50 Possession, as every first-
year law student learns to his chagrin, means a variety of things. Since
Article 9 does not purport to change the law of pledge, at least so far as
the quantum of possession required for perfection is concerned, pre-Code
law is, presumably still valid.51 And in the law, possession, like a woman,
can be a sometimes thing.
V. ThE LENDER'S DoMINioN AND QUALIFIED POSSESSION
Prior to the Code, there was no such thing in Missouri, or most
other states, as a safe, non-possessory security interest on inventory
without the lender exercising such control over the borrower's operation
to be tantamount to possession. The reason for this was the lack of
48. Section 7-403(4) defines a "person entitled [to delivery] under the docu-
ment" as a "holder," if negotiable, and if non-negotiable, as "a person to whom
delivery is to be made by the terms" of a non-negotiable document or "pursuant
to written instructions."
49. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907); Heffron v. Bank
of America, 113 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1940).
50. See Bostian v. Park Natl Bank, 226 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1955); Proctor
v. Shotwell, 105 Mo. App. 177, 79 S.W. 728 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904). Where the bor-
rower had a right of access to warehoused grain to stir it and inspect it, the
court held that it could not be said as a matter of law that the warehouseman
did not have possession. Grand Ave. Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 135 Mo.
App. 366, 115 S.W. 1071 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909). There is "a need in commercial
affairs for less onerous conditions regarding change and retention of possession in
cases of pledge than was extracted formerly." Id. at 375, 115 S.W. at 1073.
51. § 9-205; Comment 6, UCC § 9-205 (1962). See also Peter Coogan's com-
ments in The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the Code, 60
MicH. L. REv. 685 (1962) and in Symposium-A Practical Approach to the Uni-form Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAW. 5, 35 (1963).
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dominion rule or the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,52 which, simply stated,
forced the chattel mortgage lender to demand and receive an accounting
for proceeds of sale periodically, often daily, to take control of returned
goods, to have veto power over compromising accounts, and generally to
deny the borrower the right to deal with his inventory as though it were
his own.5 3 The rule was an old one,5 4 and, had the courts applied it with
a little more finesse, it would have been a good one to deal with actual
attempts by a borrower to screen his property from his creditors-true
fraudulent conveyances. As it was, it served to disrupt commerce substan-
tially, for the presumption of fraud was conclusive, and since the rule
could also apply to corporate debt financing, it managed to unnerve people
who dealt in securities. But in any event, if the lender did not exercise
this control, or "police" the loan, his security interest could be attacked
by a lien creditor or his surrogate, the trustee in bankruptcy, on the
grounds that it was conclusively fraudulent. A firmly held possessory se-
curity interest, although subject to the same rule, was safe from its ap-
plication.55
Section 9-205 of the Code eliminated the lack of dominion rule by pro-
viding that a "security interest is not invalid or fraudulent" because of
the freedom of the borrower to deal with the goods as though they were
his own or because of "the failure of the secured party to account for
proceeds or replace collateral." This benefit was reserved only to those
lenders who file a financing statement, for the requirement of possession
is not relaxed if perfection of the security interest depends upon possession.
However, there is nothing in Article 9 which prevents the pledgee or the
lender on field warehouse receipts from filing a financing statement as
52. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), contains Mr. Justice Brandeis'
oft-quoted lines, at page 363: "It [the rule] rests not upon seeming ownership be-
cause of possession retained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion
reserved."
53. See In the Matter of the New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1958) (accounts receivable).
54. For those with an antiquarian bent, an early Star Chamber case sets out
the elements of the law of ostensible ownership, retention of dominion, and other
fraudulent conveyances. See Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601),
where the court found fraud in a conveyance, denominated a "secret assignment"
by the court, whereby the mortgagor remained in possession of the mortgaged
sheep, shearing and selling the wool without accountng -for the proceeds.
55. Heffron v. Bank of America, 113 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1940).
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well as perfecting by possession.56 In this case perfection would not depend
upon possession, and the security interest would be saved from lien creditor
attack even though the field warehouse was not all that it might be.
There are no prohibitions against changing from one type of per-
fection to another; in fact, it is provided that if perfection is effected by
one means originally and then another means substituted without there
being a time when the security interest was unperfected, it is treated as
having been continuously perfected. Nor are there prohibitions against
perfecting by both filing and possession at once. It may be that the
situation of a particular borrower may require that the lender take pos-
session at one point in his operation and perfect by filing at another, or
that the lender both take possession and perfect by filing at the same time.
The various means of perfection are not repugnant to one another, and
each may give the lender certain advantages in his dealings with the bor-
rower and third parties denied him by use of the other.5 7
"Straight" field warehousing parallels the commercial warehouse
practice of issuance of receipts and delivery orders. The warehouseman
who has leased all or a portion of the borrower's storage space, partitioned
it and secured it with his own locks, and posted signs about the premises,
is openly and notoriously present. He has control over goods in the leased
area, for he allows the borrower no access to the goods without the
lender's permission.
The doors or partitions separating the borrower from the goods may
be flimsy or inadequate to prevent his forceable entry, but the fact that
the borrower can gain possession of the goods illegally does not invalidate
the security interest, any more than the theft of pledged stock certificates
from a bank vault by a pledgor invalidates the pledge5 s If there is a soft
56. Earlier official versions of the Code, including that initially adopted in
Pennsylvania, specifically required that the lender file a financing statement to
perfect a security interest involving the use of a field warehouse. See UCC § 9-305 (2)(1952) and Comment 4, UCC § 9-305 (1952).
57. § 9-303 (2): Continuity of perfection where subsequent means of perfec-
tion follows original means with no intermediate gaps.§ 9-305: Security interest may be otherwise perfected before or after period
of possession.
§ 9-312(6): Security interest, continuously perfected, is treated as though
it were perfected by original means for purpose of determining priority.
58. Theft from a bailee is simply that: theft. Theoretically, the borrower, if
he commits a trespass or a technical breaking and entering to gain possession of
the collateral, establishes the bailee's possession. Successful criminal prosecution
of the borrower is generally quite rare. As a practical matter, he is usually a local
resident, and the lender and the bailee are not. Suits for conversion or on the
indemnity agreements executed by the borrower or those persons financially in-
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spot in field warehousing, it lies in the use of the "bonded agent" to make
releases and issue warehouse receipts. Because the costs of the operation
must be borne by the borrower, it is frequently impossible to install
a regular employee of the warehouseman as the local agent on the borrower's
premises. An employee of the borrower, usually a stock clerk, is "discharged"
by the borrower and "hired" and bonded by the warehouseman and placed
on his payroll.5 9 This bonded agent still generally performs most of his
former services for his former employer, the borrower, and, more important,
expects to be "hired back" when the warehouse closes. The agent may,
therefore, be willing to allow the borrower to take some or all of the
stored goods from the warehouse without a delivery order or other prior
authorization from the receipt holder. Although this appears as though
the lender is not maintaining possession, it is not enough yet to subject
the warehouse to a successful attack by creditors.10
To assert control and maintain possession, the field warehouseman pro-
vides for duplicate copies of all warehouse receipts and delivery orders
to be sent to its accounting offices for continuous "paper audits." But more
important, "field audits" to physically check the contents of the ware-
house against the "paper audits" are performed at irregular intervals. It
is not the connivance between the bonded agent and borrower that vitiates
the warehouse receipts; fraud practiced on the warehouseman by his em-
ployee is not chargeable to the warehouseman under the lack of dominion
rule. It is the continuing practice of free dealing with the inventory by
the borrower -when the warehouseman knows, or should have known, of it,
that invalidates the security interest. When, over a course of time, the
borrower is allowed unlimited access to all of the collateral for general
purposes through the warehouseman's neglect or inadvertance, it must
be inferred that the warehouseman (and through him, his principal, the
lender) has "agreed" with the borrower that such acts are permissible.
terested in the borrower may be more valuable to the lender or bailee, but the
judgment may prove uncollectible.
The bailee may have to reimburse the lender for the loan value of the misap-
propriated collateral unless he can prove himself free from negligence; § 7-403(1)
(b). Or, in any event, he may, if the lender is a regular customer, pay the loss as
a matter of business practice. The legal elements of the bailee's possession are not
here in question, however, this may assume a greater importance in bankruptcy
than may be initially apparent.
59. Naturally, the warehouseman is reimbursed by the borrower for the
bonded agent's wages and the taxes paid relating to his employment.
60. See Bostian v. Park Nat'l Bank, 226 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1955).
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There is then no other course open but to invalidate the warehouse for
"lack of dominion" on the part of the lender.61
If a shortage is discovered during an audit, the warehouseman Must
act: he may close the warehouse, substitute a professional watchman for
the regular bonded agent, force the borrower to "cover" the shortage by
an indemnification agreement or threat of prosecution, or take possession
of other of the borrower's property as a substitute for that which van-
ished. 62 In any event, the warehouseman or the surety must make up
the shortage under the warehouseman's obligation to deliver imposed by
Article 7 of the Code. Thus the economic value of the security interest
may be saved for the lender. The key to the situation is really not the quality
of field warehouseman's possession but whether or not, from all of the
facts, it must be inferred that there was no initial delivery of possession
or that the "general possession" of the borrower was rightful. These infer-
ences may be rebutted only by prompt action of the warehouseman in as-
serting his possession and demonstrating that the borrower's possession is
wrongful by putting a halt to the borrower's practices. 3
The Code in part recognizes the common law rule that limited
possession by the pledgor does not invalidate the pledge. The lender
further may give the borrower possession for limited purposes for twenty-
one days.0 4 Section 9-304(5) continues perfection for this time period
following the surrender of the goods to the borrower for purposes of manu-
facture, processing or even sale, and, if before the twenty-one day period
61. See Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907).
62. In Keystone Warehouse Co. v. Bissell, 203 Fed. 652 (2d Cir. 1913), a
warehouseman who took a depositor's property to cover a loss occasioned when
the latter fraudulently obtained warehoused property was held not to be a creditor,
and so he did not receive a preference in the ensuing bankruptcy.
63. § 9-205. The initial theory of the Benedict v. Ratner doctrine was that
there had never been a transfer in the eyes of the law because the borrower had
never conveyed out the requisite incidents of ownership: the power to control the
disposition of the goods. Thus, it could be inferred that the parties never really
intended to create a security interest in the first place. Under the aegis of the
second circuit, the doctrine was extended to reach those cases in which, after a
valid initial transfer, the quality of the lender's ownership deteriorated until it could
be "inferred" from the lender's "acquiescence" in the borrower's assumption of
control that the security agreement had terminated. See Lee v. State Bank &
Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931).
64. § 9-304(5). This may pre-empt the common law limits to which a
pledgor might be given temporary possession of the collateral. Compare Leahy v.
Simpson's Adm'r, 60 Mo. App. 83 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894) and Petition of Chatta-
nooga Say. Bank, 261 Fed. 116 (6th Cir. 1919) (involving collateral meeting the
Code definition of "equipment"). See also RESTATEMENT, SECURrrY § 11(2) (1941).
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lapses, the security interest in those goods is perfected again, either by
filing or by possession, the goods are treated as having been under a con-
tinuously perfected security interest.65 Presumably, during the twenty-one
day period, the borrower may deal freely with the goods released to him
without danger to the lender under the lack of dominion rule, for the
lender's perfection does not depend upon possession, but upon statute.
Thus the lender may allow the borrower to obtain his raw sugar from one
warehouse, refine it, and place the refined sugar in another warehouse
without danger of third party attack on the grounds of the borrower's
ostensible ownership or his lack of dominion. Prudence would again dictate
that the lender or warehouseman maintain a running audit of release and
receiving records to make certain that none of the sugar in process or other
goods in the borrower's possession is being siphoned off.
When the borrower requires goods from the warehouse, he may procure
a delivery order from the lender, deliver it to the warehouseman, and take
delivery of the goods called for.66 If the borrower has a high volume of
sales, this procedure can be time consuming, yet the lender cannot allow
the borrower to take what he wants, as he wants it, without losing his
security, or if he has filed, then at least without giving the borrower the
unlimited access to the inventory goods which would allow him to dissi-
pate it. Pre-authorized releases of merchandise solve the problem. All that
the lender is really concerned with is keeping control over a sufficient
quantity of collateral to equal the value of the debt, allowing for the
inevitable shrinkage in value on forced sale plus a "cushion.16 7 Pre-
authorized releases may be on a "blanket release" basis, authority given
the warehouseman to release a stated dollar amount in a given period,
65. § 9-303 (2) grants continual perfection when the security interest is
originally perfected in one way and, then the means of perfection are subsequently
changed without a "gap." It is difficult to believe that a lender, after making de-
livery to the borrower under the twenty-one day rule of § 9-304(5), could not, by
retaking possession before the end of the twenty-one days, achieve continuous
perfection. The situation is common enough; for example, a lender may have a field
warehouse at a lumber mill, one warehouse for logs held in a yard and one for
finished or curing lumber. The difficulty is created by § 9-305 which dates per-
fection from the time that possession is taken unless "otherwsie" provided. Perhaps
the "temporary perfection" of § 9-304(5) will serve to place this situation into
9-303 (2).
66. This practice is more typical of commercial warehousing.
67. In Pittman v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 118 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1941),
the cotton seed warehouse was upheld as valid where the level of collateral never
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or on a "hold figure" basis, authority to release all contents of the ware-
house except a stated dollar amount. Periodically, usually at the end of
the week, a delivery order will be prepared by the warehouseman on
which the borrower acknowledges receipt of the previously released items
and which the lender executes and returns to the warehouseman to validate
the releases and to provide him with stock information. So long as the
warehouseman maintains control and legal possession over the unreleased
collateral, the lender's security interest is safe from creditor attack and
borrower dissipation.
One final innovation made in field -warehousing changed the lender's
essential character to that of a pledgee rather than that of a warehouse
receipt holder, although retaining the bare form of warehousing. Used
initially where the borrower had a high volume of items coming into the
warehouse, the bailment agreement came into use in other situations as
well and is ideally suited for operations under Article 9.08 Very briefly,
the lender, borrower, and warehouseman agree that all of the borrower's
inventory shall be pledged to the lender and placed in the warehouse as
it arrives at his premises, and that the act of bailment, itself, constitutes
the pledge, whether warehouse receipts are issued immediately or not.
The receipts are normally issued weekly showing deposits of the previous
week, and the warehouse receipt has become in reality an accounting
memorandum.69 Warehouse receipts and delivery orders are still used,
and the transactions are still couched in the form of warehousing, for
several reasons: the warehouseman's liability as a warehouseman is retained;
banking rules may prescribe the scope of acceptable collateral or may
require loans to be made on warehouse receipts; and many lenders (and
their attorneys) prefer them as security over a "bailment agreement"'
because they have had experience with them and a body of case law has
developed about them, thus giving predictability regarding outcome in
most disputes.
VI. PITFALLS OF THE BORROWER'S PossEssIoN
A lender might legitimately ask: if all of that rigamarole is involved
in protecting a field warehouse from a creditor's attack, why does my
68. See Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1955), for an example of a bailment agreement.
69. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U.S. 530 (1905). A warehouse receipt need
not be a "warehouse receipt" under state law for there to be a valid transfer of
possession sufficient to support a pledge.
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counsel advise taking all of that trouble and going to all of the expense
when a security interest in inventory can be perfected by filing two sheets
of paper at a cost of no more than ten dollars including postage, overhead
and handling? And he would be right except that the lender runs risks
other than attacks of lien creditors on unperfected security interests in
state courts. There is always the trustee in bankruptcy and the bank-
ruptcy court.
The trustee in bankruptcy, as the general creditor's surrogate, is armed
with all of the rights and powers of an actual creditor with lien rights
under state law, 70 plus a few special rights and powers of his own.71 How-
ever, the arena in which he usually exercises those powers is of most
particular concern to the lender. That arena is the bankruptcy court. The
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over property in the possession of the
bankrupt,72 and that jurisdiction is exercised in a summary manner before
a referee, 73 rather than by plenary proceeding, and the referee, oriented
toward general creditors, is more apt to be inclined to listen to the trustee
than counsel for lenders.
If the lender who allowed the collateral to remain in the borrower's
possession, seeks to recover it from the trustee's grip, he must file a reclama-
tion petition in the bankruptcy court, and by so doing, he submits himself
to the summary jurisdiction of that court, at least to the extent of his
secured interest.74 This can be disastrous if the trustee attempts to defeat
reclamation on the ground of, say, preference, and if the lender does not
try to reclaim his property, or more properly, his collateral, he may find
it being administered as part of the assets of the estate, or being reduced
in value to next to nothing as part of the inventory or other assets of a
defunct business.
If, however, the lender is in possession he can take his collateral-at
least as far as a commercial warehouse, where he can hold a sale to realize
70. Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c), 11 U.S.C., § 110(c) (1958).
71. Supra note 14.
72. Bankruptcy Act, § 23, 11 U.S.C., § 46 (1958).
73. Normally by a turn-over order or an injunction. 2 COLLIER, BANKRuPTCY
ff 23.04[21 at 452-3 (14th ed. 1964).
74. Slocum v. Edwards, 168 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1948); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Galvin, 104 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1939). This may act as an entering wedge for the
extension of summary jurisdiction over all controverted matters arising out of the
transaction as a whole.
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the loan value of his collateral at his leisure.75 If the trustee attempts to
stop him or to recover the value of the collateral it must be by a plenary
suit in state court or United States District Court.70 If the trustee attempts
to deny the lender the right of access to the collateral or attempts to gain
access to it and administer it, he may find himself defending a conversion
suit or answering in replevin, again in a state or federal district court,77
both of which are likely to be a good deal less sympathetic to the trustee.
All that the lender must do is take care not to make anything remotely
resembling an appearance in the bankruptcy court that .would subject the
warehoused assets to the court's jurisdiction. If he does, the warehouseman
may claim, with some merit, that by so doing the lender has admitted
that the field warehouse transaction was invalid, and he is, hence, the
author of his own misfortune.
Aside from technical matters such as jurisdiction of courts, possession
is protection, protection against that which might euphemistically be called
"the risk of the lack of borrower integrity. s78 This is not to say that all
borrowers are dishonest and secrete the collateral or proceeds of its sale,
nor is it intended to mean that they will refuse to pay back their loans or
fail to apply the proceeds of the sales of the collateral to the business.
But this sort of thing, repugnant to most when times are good, may be
the only apparent course open to a borrower who wants a "cushion" for
his after-bankruptcy recovery or who is pressed hard by other creditors.
The borrower in possession may find his power of sale over the inventory
and his new found power to apply the proceeds as he sees fit, no longer
restricted by the lender's once necessary policing, too much to resist. Some-
times the borrower may find his desire to enjoy expensive automobiles,
boats, clubs and private schools for his children so strong as to overwhelm
75. The lender can claim the value of the collateral only to the extent of the
indebtedness, plus expenses. § 9-504(2) requires him to account to the borrower,
or his trustee, for any overage resulting from the sale of the collateral.
Of course, the court has jurisdiction to prevent the pledgee from disrupting
the pledgor's entire enterprise or asset value by "foreclosing" the pledge. See
Mann v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank, 209 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1953) (petition pend-
ing, pledgee's motives were not confined solely to recovery of his loan).
76. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944). 2 COLLIER, BANKRo rTcY f 23.06[23
(14th ed. 1964).
77. See Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1951).
78. By virtue of § 9-205 the lender who perfects by filing is saved from
disastrous legal consequences if he makes an error in judgment in giving the bor-
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any temporary qualms about stripping his business of capital. In a sur-
prisingly short time, an industrious borrower can sell off enough of his
inventory-and the lender's collateral-and dissipate the proceeds to seri-
ously discomfort his lender and strip his own business of sufficient capital
to place it beyond even the most enthusiastic hopes of rehabilitation, if
he is not restrained by either the lender's possession or by his active
policing.
Naturally, the extent to which the lender must police each borrower
is a matter for his own business judgment, but the degree of control over
the borrower to be exerted will run the gamut from verbal assurances on
the part of the borrower in the case of some, to possession, or at least
good, old-fashioned vigorous policing, in others. From some borrowers, the
lender may not require more than periodic reports to reflect the status
of the collateral and the volume of sales; from others it may be necessary
to install one or more of the lender's own employees as a watchdog in the
borrower's stockroom or accounting department; from still others, daily
reports and actual assignment and a manual transfer of each day's pro-
ceeds may be the only solution. Probably no lender, unless he is a relative,7 9
can be content to rely on the borrower's integrity and good will without
some form of control over his free hand. And since any situation, particu-
larly an inventory financing situation, can change with the passage of
time, it would be well for the lender that the security agreement provided
for various degrees of control to be imposed at the lender's option and
the borrower's cost. 0 So, if the lender learns of changes of ownership,
death or turnover of key employees, extraordinary movements of inventory,
unusual variations of bank deposits, and so on, the signs of stormy weather,
he can move rapidly to save and rehabilitate. The point is that it is up
to him. If he has filed, he is not compelled by law to police.
The possessory lender has two strings to his bow: (1) if the field
warehouse is run properly, he has a very sure check on the borrower's
movements of inventory for unless he is careless, the value of the collateral
must always exceed the loan value; and (2) even if the borrower removes
79. The lender in Benedict v. Ratner was "family." See 282 Fed. 12 (2d Cir.
1922), sub. nom. In re Hub Carpet Co.
80. A possible solution to achieve maximum security might lie in the use of a
security agreement based on the Bailment Agreement in which the borrower not
only pledges all collateral placed in the warehouse, but also conveys, as security,
all of his rights in the collateral as those rights are acquired. Both filing and pos-
session are then used to establish perfection simultaneously.
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the collateral from the warehouse, the warehouseman is generally answer-
able on his warehouse receipts, and he is far more apt to be solvent, or
possessed of reachable assets, than any borrower who has been stripping
himself of capital.8 '
VII. INVENTORY AS AN ENrY: A MIXED BLESSING
Not all non-possessory financing is done on the basis of the so-called
"floating lien" which the Code is said to have established. In the past,
non-possessory financing developed down two main avenues. Those ap-
proaches are best exemplified by the practices required and developed
under the Factor's Lien Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.8 2 Since
both approaches are available and have their uses under Article 9, they
are of more than archeological interest, and, better, they have been stripped
of certain disabilities imposed more by their form and historical develop-
ment than by necessity. For lack of better terms they might be denomi-
nated general lien financing and specific lien financing respectively.
In an ideal financing under the factor's lien, 3 the predecessor of the
general lien, the lender advanced a lump sum to the borrower based on
the value of his inventory in possession and usually his accounts receivable
as well. The borrower made sales from his inventory, and in pre-Code days
forwarded his proceeds daily to the lender, receiving corresponding credits
in return. As new inventory arrived, it came automatically8 4 under the
security interest without a further advance from the lender. This was not
81. The lender would be entitled to the value of the warehoused items up to
the amount of the loan. Normally a storer is entitled to asset value. Russell v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 332 Mo. 707, 59 S.W.2d 1061 (1933). However, the bor-
rower-depositor would also have a claim against the warehouseman for the value
of his "equity" (unless it was the borrower's actions which caused the loss), so to
prevent double recovery or a lender's windfall, the lender is limited to a recovery
of the amount of the loan.
82. Neither the factor's lien nor the trust receipt were much used in Missouri.
The chattel mortgage was the predominant instrument of chattel security.
83. The Factor's Lien Act, §§ 430.260-.320, RSMo 1959 (repealed) gives a
continuing general lien" to anyone "who advances money on the security of mer-
chandise." It was never determined in Missouri whether or not a financing seller,
one who advances merchandise on credit, could procure a valid factor's lien. See
In the Matter of Freeman, 294 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1961).
84. Factors received their lien "on all merchandise from time to time con-
signed to or pledged with the factor." No one cared to do more than speculate
upon the sufficiency of means by which the borrower "consigned" or "pledged" the
merchandise to the factor. Compare Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp.,
68 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1934), with Colbath v. Mechanicks Nat'l Bank, 96 N.H. 110,
70 A.2d 608 (1950).
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typical purchase money financing;8 5 it was financing that treated the
borrower's inventory as an entity through which goods passed, and, in
general, the level of the loan remained about the same, or rose and fell
finally with variations in the borrower's operations and his ability to
reduce the loan.
As opposed to this, the ideal trust receipt financing was purchase
money financing;8 6 the lender supplied the wherewithal to acquire new
inventory only and, in fact, could not, under the mechanism of a statutory
or common law trust receipt, reach inventory already in the borrower's
ownership or possession.8 7 The lender received a security interest in each
item to be acquired. If the borrower was to receive thirty refrigerators,
the lender had thirty sets of papers and thirty security interests.8 8 As each
item was sold, the borrower repaid that portion of the loan attributable
to that item. As each item was to be acquired the lender advanced new
funds. Here, the loan level varied exactly with the collateral. Naturally,
the trust receipt was, and specific lien financing is, as a practical matter,
available only on fairly expensive pieces of collateral, or "hard goods,"
such as white goods, bales of cloth, automobiles, and so on, being pur-
chased and re-sold. The factor's lien and the general lien financing was
and is primarily intended for smaller items, or "soft goods," offered for
sale or component items in the process of manufacture where maintaining
a hold on, and a record of, each individual item is either impossible or
impractical, such as needles and spools of thread or the nuts and bolts used
in the manufacture of an automobile.8 9
The lack of dominion rule always had its greatest impact on general
lien financing. The specific lien and the possessory security interest gave
the lender much more control over the borrower's dealings with his inven-
85. It could be so used, however, and was so used. See note 83 supra.
86. Where the UTRA was in force, it could only be used by a third party
lender who generally took title directly from the seller by paying on an order bill
of lading. In Missouri, the trust receipt was categorized either as a bailment for
sale (valid) or a chattel mortgage (invalid for failure to record, etc.) depending
upon the "borrower's" absolute obligation to pay (debt) or 'his option to pay
or to return the merchandise (bailment). Iz re Bell Motor Co., 45 F.2d 19 (8th
Cir. 1930). The transaction could apparently be either tripartite, In re Bell Motor
Co. supra, or bipartite, Globe Sec. Co. v. Gardner Motor Co., 342 Mo. 778, 85
S.W.2d 561 (1935).
87. If he did, the lender had an invalid mortgage, supra note 86, or else
nothing at all. Forgan v. Bridges, 281 S.W. 134 (Mo. App. 1926).
88. The factor, as opposed to the entruster, would have received an undi-
vided interest in each item composing the inventory entity as security.
89. Factor's lien financing was not confined to "soft goods."
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tory; they also tended to protect the lender from risks other than the lien
creditor.
For many years, the public, including many of the legally trained,
regarded the merchant or manufacturer who borrowed on the security of
his inventory and accounts as unreliable and on the verge of bankruptcy.
In the past, with the "Mom and Pop" store or the two-man workshop,
this may have been true; to some extent and in other contexts it may
still be true today. But the very great expense outlay required to open
a new business is a compelling reason to give any responsible man with
the courage to consider beginning a new enterprise access to any source
of financing available to him, from leases of equipment90 to mortgages on
merchandise. If he can convince the lenders, -who seemingly have more
ice water in their arteries than equity investors,91 he should be allowed
to go ahead. This apparently was the thought of the drafters of Article 9.
But in the view of judge-made law, still operating under the inertia of the
landed wealth, cash payments and bubbles of the eighteenth century, the
borrower on something as unstable and evanescent as inventory was him-
self unstable, and the lender who lent on inventory was truly a second-
class citizen.
The borrower who paid off his inventory loan as quickly as possible
and who only borrowed to help himself over a rough spot was understand-
able and could be tolerated, for at least, in theory, as he paid off his loan
with the entire proceeds of his sales, that portion of his inventory which
secured it was lowered and that portion of it which was available to general
creditors was increased. Any new inventory was supposed to be free of
any secured interests, although how the borrower would stay in business
and feed himself, much less acquire new inventory, if the lack of dominion
rule required the application of the entire proceeds of his sales to pay off
the loan was never satisfactorily explained. Some excuse also could be
found for such borrowing in cyclical industries. The toy manufacturer who
accumulated inventory through the year with a big sell-off at Christmas,
and the canner who had a large acquisition of inventory at the end of
growing season and a gradual sell-off during the year, might find long
term debt too onerous and equity financing too unwieldy; both situations
90. A lease may create a security interest under certain circumstances.§ 1-201(37). United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Constr. Co., 231 Md.
552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963) (Pennsylvania law).
91. Note that there are no Blue Sky laws or their like protecting lenders.
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produce chronic, periodic, over-capitalization. For the manufacturer or
merchant who raised long term capital on his relatively level volume of
short term assets, inventory and accounts, and for the lender who aided
and abetted him, however, no excuse could be found. 92
Part of this "evil" could be prevented by judicial application of the
lack of dominion rule which required that the entire proceeds be forwarded
to the lender as they were generated, to reduce the amount of the loan.
But some clever gent, whose name is lost to us, decided that every time
the borrower forwarded the proceeds which would otherwise have reduced
the loan, a fresh advance of equal size could be made to him. So, if under
a 100,000 dollar loan, borrower received proceeds of 1,000 dollars on Monday
and forwarded it that night (in the same form) to the lender, then the
lender credited 1,000 dollars to the borrower's drawing account on Tues-
day.93 This created some problems of an administrative nature; it created
a volume of paper shuffling, with consequent chances of error,94 and also
created a substantial expense to be borne by the borrower, caused by the
necessary policing.
The other half of the problem created by general lien financing,
how to get newly acquired inventory under the security interest to take
the place of that which was removed by the borrower's sales, created a
more knotty problem, since it had to face both intrinsic defects in the old
fashioned security devices, and the Bankruptcy Act, particularly sec-
tion 60.> Under Missouri chattel security law, after-acquired property did
not come under the protection of the mortgage as it was acquired, even
92. See generally, Kripke, Current Assets-Financi-ng as a Source of Long
Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REv. 506 (1952).
93. This is a vastly oversimplified statement. See, Wilson, The New Haven
Clock Case-Another Look at Benedict v. Ratner, 13 Bus. LAW. 633 (1958). The
text also ignores differences of approach between "factoring of accounts" and
"pledging of accounts." Although the end result is about the same, the factor pur-
chases the accounts, assumes the credit risks, and makes the collections. Both are
secured transactions subject to Article 9 by virtue of § 9-102(1) (a) and (b). See,
O'Leary, Accounts Receivable as Security, 29 Mo. L. REv. 486 (1964).
94. Errors could be fatal. In Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d
Cir. 1931), an assignment of accounts in the amount of $85,590.82 was invalidated
because the lender had failed to control the borrower's disposition of $1,574.75 (or
I % of the total collateral) of returned merchandise. In Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d
350 (2d Cir. 1926), a mortgage conveying land, fixtures, and stock was totally in-
validated because of the borrower's right to dispose of the stock "for his own use."
The doctrine of infectious invalidity did not apply in Missouri. Bullene v. Barrett,
87 Mo. 185 (1885); Smith-Wallace Shoe Co. v. Wilson, 63 Mo. App. 326 (1895).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
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though the security agreement called for it, unless the borrower had at
the time of the mortgage existing rights in that property.0
A mortgage for purchase money allowed a seller to take his security
interest in the newly acquired property, at the time of sale, and a trust
receipt allowed a third party lender to take his security interest in the newly
acquired property, at the time of sale. The factor's lien was supposed to
pick up after-acquired property automatically, but, in Missouri, nobody
knew whether it did or it didn't.97 The lender who used field warehousing
got his security interest when he had the warehouse receipts or, if a bail-
ment agreement was used, when the goods were in the warehouse. All of
this was fine, but in Missouri there was no way to get a predictable, safe,
general lien on inventory that automatically picked up after-acquired
property.
The Code, in section 9-204(3), provides that a security interest can
be made to apply to after-acquired property by the simple expedient of
so providing in the security agreement 9 8 and perfection is obtained by
mentioning it on the financing statement.9 1 By executing a simple agreement
with the borrower, and procuring the borrower's signature on a financing
statement, the lender may acquire a security interest on the borrower's
inventory both as it stands when the agreement is signed and as it may
change from time to time through acquisition to and withdrawals from
the borrower's stock. The internal defects, spawned by the historical de-
velopment of the mortgage and furthered by the legal disapproval of
inventory financing, have been overcome. This leaves remaining but one
deterrent to taking a general lien type security interest on after-acquired
property: section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Briefly stated, the law on preferences provides that transfers to a credi-
tor may be voidable if made within four months of bankruptcy, upon ante-
cedent consideration, while the debtor is insolvent.100 This has two appli-
cations in the context of secured financing. The trustee may reach back
96. Bank of Kennett v. Clayton, 241 Mo. App. 487, 245 S.W.2d 678 (1951).
It was effective between the parties in equity, France v. Thomas, 86 Mo. 80(1885).
97. Notes 83, 84 supra.
98. Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441(1964).
99. § 9-402(1).
100. The preference is voidable only if the creditor knew, or should have
known, that the debtor was insolvent. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b)(1958).
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four months to destroy security interests which for a while were unper-
fected during that time, but which became perfected prior to the date of
bankruptcy and were then no longer vulnerable to lien creditor attack,
and consequently, attack under sections 70(c) or 70(e). 101 For example,
a chattel mortgage on inventory violating the lack of dominion rule could
not be reached under either subparagraph of section 70 if the lender took
possession of the inventory before bankruptcy, for no lien creditor attack-
ing after the mortgagee took possession could reach it. However, the
trustee, under section 60, could reach the same collateral if the lender
had taken possession within the four month period since the "transfer"
took place at the time that the security interest was perfected. Under the
Code and the Bankruptcy Act combined, a security interest may attach
to the inventory as it becomes the property of the debtor, and, if the
financing statement is filed within twenty-one days, perfection relates back
to execution. This area of application of section 60 need not concern the
nonpossessory or possessory lender who, with a little care makes sure
that his security interest is perfected by filing 02 without a gap.
The other aspect of section 60 is of more concern to the Code lender.
This may be illustrated by the following example: A, the lender, advances
10,000 dollars to B on security of B's inventory, worth, at present, 10,000
dollars. The pre-Code security interest is a factor's lien, perfected, policed
and immune from attack on the basis of fraud. B receives 3,000 dollars
of additional inventory the next week. The security interest now covers
13,000 dollars of inventory, assuming that no sales have been made. If B
goes into bankruptcy, the trustee, assuming he can make his case, may
avoid A's security interest to the extent of 3,000 dollars, and if B had sold
2,000 dollars of his original inventory by that time, A's security interest
might only apply to 8,000 dollars of that inventory and no more. The
reason: A had received some of B's property for an antecedent considera-
tion. 0 3 This could have been avoided had "specific lien" financing and
"revolving credit" been used. Ideally, there a fresh advance is made to
101. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943) (a
transfer, for the purpose of § 60(a), is "made" when it is perfected). This aspect of
preference law is directed at either "secret liens," which becomes "public" (by
filing or recording) immediately prior to bankruptcy or at the creditor who did
not act like a creditor until the imminent failure of his borrower (the Benedict v.
Ratner situation).
102. § 9-205.
103. This second aspect of preference law is directed against the creditor who
is given better treatment than the other creditors of the same class by the borrower.
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the borrower at the time that the security interest in the new property
is transferred to the lender, 04 and the borrower, of course, repays a portion
of the total loan as he makes his sales. Likewise, the lender could have
released an amount of inventory from the security interest to the borrower
whenever a corresponding amount of new inventory was presented to the
lender as security, for the release of the collateral to the borrower consti-
tutes fresh consideration or "new value."'105
Because mortgages and other security devices are creatures of state
law, state law-the Code-can remove any of their intrinsic defects. The
Bankruptcy Act is, however, federal law, although it operates in the field
of rules created by state law.'08 If a pre-Code chattel mortgage was
invalid because of the lender's failure to take dominion in Missouri, but
not in Massachusetts, a trustee in bankruptcy acting under section 70
could reach it in Missouri, but not in Massachusetts. The same rules gen-
erally apply to section 60. The logical course open to the drafters to avoid
the effect of section 60 was to change the state law rules in which the
Bankruptcy Act operated. Section 9-108 simply provides that after-acquired
collateral should be deemed taken for new value if the debtor acquires the
property "in the ordinary course of business or under a purchase contract
made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after
new value is given." The ideal of the general lien on inventory has been
achieved. The lender can make his one big advance, file, and simply sit
back while his security interest gathers in new collateral as it arrives without
the necessity of policing or of doing one further thing to avoid application
of section 60, even though the security interest swells in value due to
the excess of new additions over withdrawals by sale.10 7 The short term
assets of the borrower have been placed on parity as collateral with his
buildings and other long term assets.
The Comments to section 9-108 indicate that the drafters feel that
the redefinition of what makes up antecedent consideration will be effec-
tive in bankruptcy, since "the determination of when a transfer is for
104. In this way, each security interest in each item of collateral stands by
itself on a fresh loan.
105. Walker v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 217 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1954). Ex-
change of collateral of equal value under a security interest do not constitute a
preference, either under a "net worth" theory or a "fresh value" theory.
106. 4 COLLIER, BANKurcY ff 70.07 at 984 n.8 (14th ed. 1964).
107. No matter what type of security interest the lender may have, he can
only claim its sale price up to the loan level plus expenses and no more without
agreement from the borrower. §§ 9-504(1), 9-505(2).
[Vol. 31
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/3
REDUCTION OF LENDING RISKS
antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law."' 0 s
Maybe, but there are grounds to believe that this is not quite so clear
as the Comments seem to indicate. The typical instance in which state
law makes this determination is in the area of perfection of transfers, i.e.,
the question of late perfection constituting a preference, or whether or
not the parties really intended to create a debt'0 9 rather than determining
whether or not consideration was actually antecedent to an actual acqui-
sition of property.1" 0 The law of preference, although not uniquely a
creature of the Bankruptcy Act, has most of its force and effect under that
Act, and the formidable corpus of law growing out of section 60 might
be said to be a body of federal common law expressing the spirit of the
Act: "Equality (among creditors) is Equity." If a federal court ignored
section 9-108 it would not be the first time that the contrary provisions
of state law had been overridden by the "spirit" of the Bankruptcy Act,"'
and the federal courts might do just that on the grounds that: (a) section
9-108 is contrary to the plain meaning of the words "antecedent considera-
tion" in section 60;112 and (b) the general lien, if applied to the maximum
extent allowable, leaves too little in the way of assets for unsecured creditors
and special claimants." 3 Many lenders are proceeding cautiously in this
area, still using specific lien financing of the trust receipt or field ware-
house type rather than the general lien until they are certain of the course
that the courts will take, choosing to accept disadvantages of fresh ad-
vances and constant pay-offs reminiscent of pre-Code days in order to
protect their security interest from attack and dissolution.
VIII. PRIORITY AND COMPETING LENDERS
Up to this point, one of the most fascinating areas of Article 9 has
been ignored: priority and its attendant problems. Priority between con-
108. Comment, UCC § 9-108 (1962). Sometimes the Comments do not say
what the statute says. Many of the Comments are survivors of earlier versions of
the Code and were not revised when the sections to which they pertain were re-
vised. Then, too, the Commentators knew what they wanted the Code to say.
109. See Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951).
110. See discussion, 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.51 A [7.2] (14th ed. 1964).
111. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
112. After all, the words are very clear.
113. Determining the intention of the parties has always been a nearly ir-
reversible ground for the courts to accomplish "substantial justice," which gen-
erally means taking a quick swing at a "fat cat" secured creditor. Using the




Stroh: Stroh: Reduction of Lending Risks
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
flicting claims of secured lenders and other persons is determined by rules
which are themselves dependent upon the means used by the lender to
perfect his security interest and the time at which he did it.114 Simply put,
the priority status of any lender is shorthand for saying what advantages
that lender may, or may not, have over another person claiming an interest
in the property. Article 9 provides that priority among inventory lenders,
who are not in the special category of purchase money lenders, is determined
by either the "first to file" or "first to perfect" 11 rules. These rules are
somewhat more easily stated than applied, for like perfection, priority
rules may be selective. Because a lender is the first to perfect his security,
he is not guaranteed priority; he may have to do something else other
than merely perfect by filing or by possession in order to gain an advan-
tage over another person who may otherwise be dangerous to him.
By itself, the first to file rule, if all secured parties file, does not lead
to an unjust result between the lenders. It is highly unlikely that any lender
would advance funds to any borrower on the security of his inventory or
any other property without first checking the filings. If a potential lender
discovers that someone else has filed with regard to his borrower on
the same type of collateral he wants to lend on, he is asking for trouble
if he advances one cent on that property, for the first person to file has
the potentiality to take a prior position whether or not he has a security
interest in that inventory at the time that the second filer makes his advance.
For example, Jones, the first filer who takes a security agreement and
files on March 1st and then advances 10,000 dollars on March 20, takes
the prior position to Brown who both filed and made his advance on the
10th. But not all lenders may choose to perfect by filing. If Jones had
not advanced any money by the 10th, and Brown took possession on the
10th, Brown would hold the paramount position since the first to perfect
rule would award priority to him."16 Jones could not prevail against the
possessory lender because he (Jones) could not have perfected until
March 20. The first to perfect rule is couched in terms of perfection of a
security interest, and Jones had no security interest to perfect until he
gave value.
A "non-possessory" security interest, to digress for a moment, may
114. Generally Art. 9, part 3.
115. §§ 9-312(5) (a), 9-312(5) (b) respectively.
116. Whether or not Brown would take the borrower's word that no "value"
had passed is another matter.
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attach to the property at a much earlier time than under previous law.
The existence of the lender's non-possessory security interest in the collat-
eral no longer depends upon title being in the borrower or on the borrower's
possession, although, where third parties' rights may be involved, the lender
can acquire only that which the borrower has or has the power to give. 117
Attachment of a security interest cannot occur until the borrower acquires
"rights" in the collateral,"" but a security agreement granting a security
interest in after-acquired property can be executed long in advance, and
the general lien interest attaches to the collateral automatically as the
borrower acquires rights in it, without the necessity of "consignments"
and the like. The nature of the "rights" that the borrower must have for
attachment is left undefined,119 but in the case of a buying borrower,
sufficient rights in the incoming collateral would probably be acquired no
later than that time at which he acquires an "insurable interest" in the
goods under Article 2.120
If the financing statement covers after-acquired goods of that kind,
the security interest is perfected eo istante with no gaps into which
another lender can insert himself. In contrast, a strictly "possessory"
security interest, if there is no written agreement providing for attachment
at an earlier time, attaches upon the lender's possession-the same time as
perfection, generally. 121 Observe the time gap: the non-possessory interest
attaches instantly with the acquisition of rights and is perfected upon
attachment, but the possessory security interest normally attaches and
is perfected sometime later, when the lender gets possession. If two lenders
who perfect by different means are competing for priority in the same
property, the time of perfection controls, under the first to perfect rule,
and a security interest cannot be perfected until it attaches. Assume that
Brown, who has examined the records and has found no filing on his
117. § 9-311. Although the second lender may acquire only an interest in the
borrower's "equity," the priority system could give him a boost up the ladder. The
first lender could prevent this as a practical matter by filing and by making the
transfer constitute a default.
118. § 9-204(1).
119. § 1-201(36). See Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Supp.
327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964), where a buyer who had possession of property did not
have "rights" in the property until he executed a conditional sale contract, absent
a showing of the nature of his possession. When the contract was signed the rights
accrued to a security interest held by a general lienor under an after-acquired
property clause. The purchase money lienor had neglected to file in the proper place.
120. § 2-501.
121. §§ 9-203, 9-305.
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borrower's inventory, establishes a field warehouse under a combination
of a bailment agreement and hold figure release instructions on March 10.
Assume further that Jones on March 11, with full knowledge of the field
warehouse, files and advances money to the borrower on his inventory.
Finally, on March 15, the hold figure limit is reached, and on March 18
new inventory arrives which is intermingled with that remaining in the
warehouse. The possessory lender has acquired a perfected security interest
in the new collateral already subject to a perfected interest by filing. Over
the course of time, as the goods turn over, the possessory lender will find
himself with a field warehouse full of goods on which someone has a prior
security interest, and which came into the warehouse subject to that
perfected security interest. If Brown had modified the security agreement
to pick up intangible rights and had also filed on the 11th but before
Jones, as well as taking possession, he would be doubly protected, since
he would still have been first to file on the after-acquired property.
Apparently, the possessory lender who does not file must check the
filings at least periodically to make certain that no one is cutting in ahead
of him with a non-possessory interest. It makes no difference in the priority
scheme on this type of financing if one lender has knowledge of the other
when he gives value and his security interest attaches. Between competing
security interests, knowledge is immaterial. 122 Filing a financing statement
is strictly "notice" filing, putting the file searcher on notice that the bor-
rower's inventory is not "clean." He has been warned; it is up to him to
ascertain the details. Similarily, a field warehouse gives notice of the pos-
sessory lender's claim to anyone who visits the borrower's physical plant.
Presumably, no professional lender would advance a significant amount
on inventory without physically examining that inventory as well as making
a file search. Proof of this knowledge, important only in the context of
purchase money financing,123 is another matter.
Since the purchase money financer may file his financing statement
within ten days after his security interest attaches and achieve "relation-
back,"' 24 it may be contended that, even though he does not qualify for
122. Except in the case of the purchase money lender. § 9,312(3) (b).
123. § 9-312(3)(c).
124. See text, sup ra at 215.
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the special priority under section 9-312(3),125 he may yet be the winner
as "first-to-perfect" in a contest with a field warehouse lender who took
possession prior to the time of actual filing, but after the date that the
purchase money interest attached. Here is another instance where the dif-
ference between perfection and priority must be observed. When he files
on the ninth day, the purchase money lender obtains protection from
creditors whose liens may have reached the collateral in the gap and bulk
transferees. This protection is confined to attacks made by these two
categories of persons. It may be "perfection," but it is not the perfection
referred to in the first to perfect rule which deals, rather, with the time
that the act giving perfection was accomplished, for section 9-301(2)
merely gives the purchase money lender priority over the lien creditor
and bulk transferee if he files within the ten day period; it does not give
him priority over other secured lenders.
Double financing, particularly when carried on over a period of time,
highlights one of the more intriguing theoretical, and yet eminently prac-
tical, questions in Article 9: what are the dimensions of a security interest?
Consider the following: Jones advances 10,000 dollars to borrower on
his inventory (worth 20,000 dollars at distress prices), and files to perfect,
the filing covering future advances. Brown moves the collateral into a
field warehouse and advances 10,000 dollars. Jones, as the first to perfect,
clearly had the prior interest. On the borrower's default and the sale of the
inventory, he takes the first 10,000 dollars. Brown takes what is left up
to the amount of his loan.
If Jones advances a second 10,000 dollars after Brown's advance the
result may not be so simple. It is possible to contend that Jones is prior to
Brown to the full extent of his advances, that is, he takes the first 20,000
dollars, and Brown gets the remainder. After all, Jones had filed, and his
first filing is an umbrella; 2 6 since Brown was warned by the claim for
future advances made in the financing statement he cannot be heard to
complain. The primary thrust of this argument is directed to protection
of the integrity of the filing system. Once having examined the filings and
the borrower's credit, and having learned that there were no filings made
125. If the purchase money lender failed to give the proper notice to other
secured lenders, he would lose his priority status as against them although his
perfection under the ten day rule would still relate back as against intervening
lienors, giving him priority against them. See Thomson v. 0. M. Scott Credit Corp.,
28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (Chester County Ct. 1962).
126. This is perfectly true under § 9-312(5) (a), but there are two rules.
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previously to his, the lender should be entitled to rely on this. The weak-
ness in this position is that lenders do not advance significant sums of
money, particularly on a flow of property, even though it is repeat business,
without, as a practical matter, actually checking judgments, tax liens and
the borrower's credit status and physically visiting his premises. It is
equally possible to contend that, although Jones is prior to Brown to the
extent of the first 10,000 dollars, he is subordinate, with regard to his
second 10,000 dollars, to Brown's claim for 10,000 dollars. Had Jones, at
the time of the first advance, obligated himself to make the second ad-
vance, justice would require that the entire 20,000 dollars be held to be
one obligation and entitled to priority for the whole. But if he had not
committed himself to make the second advance, his two loans constitute
two separate givings of value and two separate obligations to pay on the
part of the borrower.
A security interest is, by definition, an interest in property to secure
performance of an obligation.12 7 The first to file rule may effect a merger
and up-dating of security interests, bringing them all up to the date of
filing, but the first to perfect rule does not so operate. Since the second
advance was a separate obligation, and security interests can exist only
in terms of the underlying obligation, there should be no merger under
the first to perfect rule. There was no security interest until the advance
was made, and the security interest could not be perfected until it had
attached.12 8 The fact that Jones' security agreement and the filing covered
future advances (if made) does not militate against the foregoing analysis
since he did not have to make the second advance. Only judicial resolu-
tion can supply the answer, 2 9 but the question should never be raised
in the first place except in the case of inadvertance or plain laziness on
the part of various lenders. It has been previously demonstrated that
there is a wide gap between that which the lender may do without loss
of his security interest by operation of law through inadequacy or insuf-
ficiency of the instruments or his efforts, and what the prudent lender will
do to protect his interest from attack or other subsequent loss of value.
The priority rules are subject to the same sort of built-in goad to
127. § 1-201(37).
128. There must also be in existence a security agreement by which the bor-
rower grants an interest to the lender either in writing and signed or evidenced by
possession. See American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 196 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1963).
129. The conflicting views are spread through recent literature on Article 9.
To generalize, the teaching portion of our profession lean toward the first view;
the practicing lawyers toward the second.
[Vol. 31
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compel the lender to protect himself in areas of risk exposure. It cannot
be reiterated too often that inventory financing, like dealing with nego-
tiable documents of title, is a matter for energetic professionals, and the
amateur, the lazy, or the inadvertent have no place in the business.
We have seen that a lender can acquire a prior position with regard
to all of the borrower's inventory, as well as his other chattel property
by filing a financing statement in broad; general terms, and advancing
money. If only the financing statement is filed, and no value given nor
security agreement executed, the lender cannot have a perfected security
interest but by filing. He has placed himself in a position from which he
may at any time obtain priority over other lenders merely by executing
the agreement and giving value. Much has been made of this: that such
a lender, if he so desires, may by his filing cut off the borrower from any
other source of secured financing on his chattel property, and by use of this
leverage, extort ruinous conditions, et cetera, from him. It is possible, al-
though it is highly unlikely to happen for several reasons.
It is, first, doubtful that any borrower would sign such a broad fi-
nancing statement except through ignorance, negligence, or inadvertence,
unless there was every indication that such a loan would actually be made.
Second, unless the lender has made an advance, or has obligated himself
to make one, the borrower can compel the execution of a termination state-
ment by the lender, terminating the filing, possibly by use of an equity
proceeding if no other way is available. 130 Finally, if he can convince an-
other lender that no money has been advanced, or value given, he has
available collateral if the second lender will use possessory financing, tak-
ing priority under the first to perfect rule. But if the first lender has filed,
if he has advanced ten dollars to the borrower, and the security agreement
provides that future advances may be made and will be secured by the
same collateral if made, and the financing statement covers future advances,
the situation is not the same. So long as he has an obligation outstanding,
the borrower cannot compel the execution of a termination statement. The
second, the would-be possessory lender, unable to predict the outcome in
130. § 9-404(1) provides for a $100.00 plus amount-of-the-loss penalty to be
assessed against the lender who refuses to execute a termination statement. Pre-
sumably the availability of this remedy does not preclude any other remedies the
borrower might otherwise have had. The Code does not displace the general rules
of law and equity, by virtue of § 1-103. See French Lumber Co. v. Commercial
Realty & Fin. Co., 346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964). And generally, obliga-
tions created by the Code may be enforced in a civil action. § 1-106(2).
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a double financing priority scramble, may hesitate to make a loan because
of the future advances clause in the financing statement. If he wanted to,
the ten dollar lender could subordinate his security interest on future ad-
vances to the loan of the second lender,13 ' but, after all why should he?
IX. THE PURCHASE MONEY EXcEPTION
It was foreseen that a lender could pervert the provisions made for
the benefit of all lenders into a trap for an unwary borrower when Article
9 was drafted.' 3 2 The general lien's power and the broad financing state-
ment can be limited and their effects curbed by the use of a special sort
of specific lien financing: purchase money financing.8 3 Form in this instance
is not very important: documents resembling the conditional sale contract
if the financer is the seller, the trust receipt if a third party lender, or a
purchase money mortgage or straight field warehouse, if either, may be
used. The economic substance of the transaction is vital: the credit ex-
tended to the borrower must be actually used to acquire new merchandise.
For a financing seller, this is simple and automatic; for a lending agency,
it requires a small amount of preparation and care. The lender may pay
the seller directly, pay on an order bill of lading as in trust receipt financ-
ing, or deliver a check payable to the seller's order to the borrower ear-
marked for application to acquisition of new collateral.
If the collateral is inventory, the purchase money lender must perfect
his security interest by taking possession or filing before the borrower
takes possession, and must notify, before the borrower receives possession,
any other secured party of whom he knows or who has filed claiming the
same collateral, that he, the purchase money lender, has or will have a
purchase money security interest in certain specified inventory of the
borrower.1 4 If the purchase money lender has followed the rules, then
he will achieve a priority over all other lenders with regard to those items
131. § 9-316.
132. The classic situation is the lender who lends on the security of a bulldozer
and procures the borrower's signature on a financing statement covering "road
building equipment." Although the lender does not 'have a security interest in any
other of the borrower's equipment, he may have foreclosed the borrower's access
to most other equipment financing. In the future, if the lender did advance further
sums and procured a security agreement on a tractor, he would have priority over
any lender other than a purchase money lender who had also lent the borrower
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of collateral for whose acquisition he supplied the value. The purchase
money lender receives another benefit which has been previously discussed,
giving him a unique status. If he files his financing statement within ten
days after the goods come into the borrower's possession, he cuts off the
lien of any lien creditor which attached to the property during that period.
As a result of section 9-312(3), the purchase money lender receives
priority in the goods acquired through his extension of credit, but the
general lienor who claimed, and filed on, "all inventory" through his se-
curity agreement also has an interest in those goods, albeit subordinated. 35
If the items composing the collateral making up the purchase money
security interest are readily identifiable as being different in type or kind
from all other items or identifiable by serial numbers, and they are so
identified, all well and good; the purchase money lender can demand
payment of his loan as the items composing his collateral are sold and
retire from the field having been made whole, or he can continue to finance
on a purchase money basis. But if the purchase money collateral is not
identifiably different from the remainder, or if it is composed of items
which are fungible with other items of the borrower's inventory, a problem
presents itself. How can the purchase money lender, or the general lienor,
for that matter, tell when his collateral has been sold-? This is imperative
for the purchase money lienor. He has no prior interest in property not
under his security interest because of the very nature of his security
agreement. The mere fact that he executed a broad security agreement
and filed a financing statement covering "inventory" does not operate to
broaden or upgrade his lien on the remainder of the inventory, and' in
actual practice, his security agreement will only cover that collateral for
which he supplied the value.136 Unless the purchase money lender segre-
gates his "fungible" collateral, he may be relegated to an unsatisfactory
135. § 9-312(3)(c) requires the purchase money lienor to set out with some
specificity, compared to the general requirements of the financing statement,
§ 9-110, the collateral in which he claims an interest. In any event, the purchase
money lienor's only hope will be in showing the finder of fact that he supplied the
wherewithal for the borrower's acquisition of specified collateral, § 9-107, which he
is presently attempting to recover. The other lienors are not so limited, and a
security agreement and financing statement in broad terms is adequate for his
protection.
136. In connection with a broader security agreement, he might receive a sub-
ordinate security interest in the remainder of the collateral. The fact that a broad
financing statement was filed would not give the lender a -broad security interest
unless the security agreement was equally broad in coverage. Cain v. Country Club
Delicatessen supra note 119.
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tracing contest with the general lienor to determine how much of the
collateral of each has been sold, and more important, whose collateral is
remaining. The convenient means of segregation would, be to require the
borrower to store the purchase money collateral in a different location
from the rest of the inventory. This may be impractical for a number
of reasons. The purchase money lender may have to turn to a field ware-
houseman to protect himself, invoicing the goods directly to the ware-
houseman, even though he may also file a financing statement for protection
if he believes that he is, or will be, exposed to other risks of lending.
X. "DUAL" PERFECTION FOR NOTIcE AND CONTROL
In a situation in which maximum risk exposure can be anticipated,
counsel's solution should be a recommendation to the lender that he perfect
by filing a financing statement and also take possession of the collateral,
if not personally, then by a field warehouse. The arrangement may be
expensive to the borrower, and by his insistence upon possession in risk
situations the lender may lose the chance to make some loans or the
financing seller will lose a few sales. But simple arithmetic will demonstrate
to the lender that in maximum or high risk situations, his reduction of
revenue from making a few less loans cannot be compared to the unreim-
bursed loss of the entire value of even one loan. On the other hand the
financing seller may be in a different position: his interest in maintaining
product outlets may so far outweigh the potential loss on a bad risk, that
he may feel compelled to lend where it might not otherwise be prudent. Un-
der prior law with its fragmentation of chattel security law, such a combina-
tion of possession and recording would have been unthinkable.1 7 The lender
had, either a mortgage or a pledge. If he took possession of the mortgaged
collateral, the lender obviously thought the mortgage was no good; if the
lender took a chattel mortgage on collateral in the field warehouse, he
obviously thought the warehouseman did not have possession. Thus the
lender either rose or fell with his choice of security device; the fact that
one of them was inadequate to give the lender the protection called for
in any situation made no difference to the law.
A security interest under the Code is simply a security interest; any
lender can get one. It is what he does with it that controls the outcome
137. Actually it was only unthinkable under judge made law. The Factor's
Lien Act allowed "perfection" by possession rather than by notice filing, if the
lender chose. § 430.300, RSMo 1959 (repealed).
[Vol. 31
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/3
REDUCTION OF LENDING RISKS
of any dispute. Article 9 provides for three methods of perfection of a
security interest on chattels: filing a financing statement, taking possession,
and a temporary immunization from lien creditor attacks following pos-
session. But filing and taking possession are each something more than
the means of staving off a hungry creditor with a lien; they are, to varying
degrees, the means of halting borrower incursions into collateral, keeping
the property out of the bankruptcy court, advancing the time of attach-
ment of the security interest, overcoming the lack of dominion rule, and
manipulating the priority ladder. They are means of reducing lending risks,
just as specific lien financing reduces lender's risks which are otherwise
present in general lien financing. The Code contemplates that the lender
may take possession of the collateral and file a financing statement either
alternatively or simultaneously. By taking extra care, time and expense,
and using the specific lien financing methods available under Article 9
combined with filing and posession, the lender can achieve the most secure
security possible to the inventory financer.
In conclusion, it can only be reiterated that there is a tremendous
difference between that very minimum allowable under the Code which
gives the lender a security interest cognizable in the eyes of the law and
that which may be done to render a security interest secure. The various
gradients of control which the lender may exert on the borrower and
some of the several kinds of trouble which may be eliminated have been
explored to suggest, at least, that in more cases than not, counsel should
recommend to his client that he continue his pre-Code practices, but now,
for reasons of choice rather than of legal compulsion. The lodestar of any
commercial security transaction, especially one intended to operate over
some period of time, must be the achievement of outcome-control over any
of several potential risk situations by the exercise of risk-eliminating pro-
cedures, not merely control procedures. After the potential danger has
developed into actuality, it may be too late. By selective use of the avail-
able mechanisms, predictability of outcome can be assured. The question
which lender's counsel must ask as his client prepares to make a loan is:
to what material risks may the security interest be exposed? He has at
hand the means to eliminate them.
Certainly, the lender should do more than the Code's minimum; the
extent to which he exceeds that minimum is left to his own business
judgment. No one would insist upon the application of specific lien financ-
ing procedures, filing, and the use of a field warehouse in every situation.
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But Article 9 has given the inventory lender the means to exercise more
control over his own destiny than he ever had before; it is up to him
to use the thought, foresight, and judgment necessary to avail himself
of them.
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